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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
portions of the accident report were not privileged. In light of the
waiver involved, the O'Keefe decision cannot be taken as conclusive
on the issue of privilege. But it is a step forward and perhaps the
next court to face the same issue will clarify any uncertainty.
Accepting the premise that certain portions of the accident report
should be privileged, there is no reason to believe that the court by
in camera examination cannot protect the varied interests by using
as its determinative standard the public interest in: (1) making
available to all parties in a law suit the information necessary to
guarantee a just result, and (2) protecting the confidential nature
of certain testimony which would otherwise be unavailable in flight
safety investigations.
GERALD M. MAYO
Future rnterests-Contingent Class Gifts-Implied
Conditions of Survivorship
In a class gift of a future interest, should a requirement be
implied that only members surviving the preceding estate share the
remainder estate when the only condition precedent attached to their
interest is unrelated to survival? In Lawson v. Lawson1 the court
implied such a requirement on the contingent interest. Testator
devised a life estate to his daughter and, at her death, to her chil-
dren and, if she had no children, then to her whole brothers and
sisters. The daughter survived testator and died without children
or descendants of children. Four brothers and sisters survived the
daughter, and two brothers survived the testator but predeceased the
daughter. The court held the alternative remainder interests of the
class to be contingent due to the condition precedent that the life
tenant die without children. Without distinguishing contingencies
based on survivorship and on unrelated conditions precedent, it per-
mitted only class members surviving the life tenant to share the
remainder interest. Exclusion of descendants of predeceased broth-
ers implied a requirement of survivorship to distribution where the
only express condition was unrelated to survival.
That a remainder is contingent should not be a sufficient basis
O'Keefe decision as based on waiver, whereas plaintiffs' counsel contend
that the court made it quite clear as to which portions of the accident report
privilege is appropriate.
1267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
[Vol. 45
CONTINGENT CLASS GIFTS
for implying a survivorship requirement without regard to the na-
ture of the contingency. By distinguishing between interests con-
tingent due to a condition precedent unrelated to survival and
contingent due to express conditions of survivorship, the court can
avoid the legal consequences reached in Lawson. Such distinction
would enable all members of the class living at distribution, as well
as descendants and devisees of predeceased members, to share the
remainder interest.
The Restatement of Property? and the text writers3 support the
position that a requirement of survivorship should not be implied
upon a totally unrelated contingency. Lawson falls squarely within
the Restatement.'s view4 that courts have erroneously implied sur-
vivorship due solely to a condition unrelated to survival. The courts
are divided5 as to implying such a condition, and the decisions are
'3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940):
In the limitation purporting to create a remainder, or an executory
interest, the presence of a condition precedent, or of a defeasibility,
dependent on other facts is not a material factor in determining the
existence of the requirement of survival to the time of the fulfillment
or elimination of such other condition precedent or defeasibility.
Id. comment a at 1315:
The rule stated in this Section would be almost too obvious for state-
ment if it were not for the erroneous view, often expressed in cases
concerning class gifts, that the members of the class necessarily re-
main subject to the condition precedent of survival so long as the
ultimate ascertainment of the class is postponed by another defeasi-
bility or condition precedent of such gift.
' 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (1952):
There is a substantial body of authority to the effect that the presence
of a condition unrelated to survival does not imply a condition of
survival to the time when possession is to be enjoyed.
2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 334 (1966):
Thus, if A limits property "to B for life, remainder to his issue, but
if B dies without issue, then to C and his heirs," C's future interest
is clearly subject to a condition precedent, namely, that B shall die
without issue, but this affords no basis for a finding that C cannot
take unless he survives B's death without issue.
SIMhs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 594 (2d ed. 1956):
Certainly there is no rule of law that a condition precedent of sur-
vivorship is implied whenever a gift is subject to any other condition
precedent.
There are also cases where the courts have confused the meaning
of the word "contingent" as subject to a condition precedent of sur-
vivorship and "contingent" as subject to any condition precedent
whatsoever, and have thought that, if an interest be contingent in the
second sense, it is contingent also in the first sense.
'3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940).
Compare it re Ferry's Estate, 13 Cal. Rptr. 180, 361 P.2d 900 (1961);
Payne v. Rosser, 53 Ga. 662 (1875); Daniel v. Donohue, 215 Ore. 373,
333 P.2d 1109 (1959); and Booth's Trust, 400 Pa. 117, 161 A.2d 376 (1960),
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
not harmonious.' Some find the alternative remainder to be vested
during the life estate,' thereby posing* no survivorship problem,
while others8 adhere to the Restatement rule of not implying sur-
vivorship on unrelated conditions. -An extreme example of the latter
is Bomberger's Estate' where an express condition of survivorship
was attached to the first taker- of an alternative contingent interest
but not to the class of second takers. The first taker predeceased
the life tenant. The court refused to imply the condition on the
second takers and permitted the ntire class to- share the interest
without regard to their survival of the life tenant.
There is substantial authority'0 that such a requirement should
be implied, but Illinois and Michigan are illustrative of an apparent
trend" against such implication. In Drury v. Drury' only mem-
bers of the class surviving the life tenant were permitted to share
the alternative contingent remainder. The court in Hofing v.
Willis" overruled Drury (stating that it had been vigorously con-
demned) and held there should be no "mechanical and universal
rule of construction that a class gift of a future interest which is
contingent on an event other than survivorship is also contingent
on survivorship."' 14 In re Coots Estate5 involved an alternative
contingent remainder to designated devisees where the court per-
with Ballentine v. Foster, 128 Ala. 638, 30 So. 481 (1900) ; Auld v. Andrade,
31 Hawaii 1 (1929); In re Floyd-Jones Estate, 3 Misc. 2d 833, 154
N.Y.S.2d 668 (Surr. Ct. 1956); Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d
202 (1953); and Houston v. Harberger, 377 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
' SIMES & SMITE, FUTURE INTERESTS § 655 (2d ed. 1956).
'E.g., Pointer v. Lucas, 131 Ind. App. 10, 169 N.E.2d 196 (1960);
Newsome v. Scott, 200 Va. 833, 108 S.E.2d 369 (1959), petition for cert.
dismissed, 365 U.S. 604 (1961).
" See cases cited note 5 supra.
0347 Pa. 465, 32 A.2d 729 (1943).
10 See cases cited note 5 supra.
Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Sur-
vival, 49 CALIF. L. Rv. 431, 439 (1961):
It would therefore seem to be clear in California, as it should be and
is becoming in other jurisdictions, that the existence of another condi-
tion precedent is immaterial in questions of survival. It should not
matter whether the contingent interest in question is in the nature of
a remainder or an executory interest. Also it should not matter that
such interest is in class gift form. That is, if the gift in' question is
one to a class, that class should be treated the same as it would be
treated if the future interest were unconditional.12271 Ill. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1915).
1031 Ill. 2d 365, 201 N.E.2d 852 (1964).
21 Id. at 373, 201 N.E.2d at 856.
" 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931).
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mitted only devisees surviving the life estate to share the remainder.
Subsequent to this holding, Michigan enacted legislation 6 prevent-
ing implied conditions of survivorship in contingent gifts to indi-
viduals and to classes.
Some courts distinguish between alternative contingent remain-
ders to individuals and to classes. They do not imply a requirement
of survivorship in the former on the theory that persons to take are
certain and only the event upon which they are to take is uncertain.1
In contingent gifts to a class, they reason that the takers and the
event are uncertain,. 8 and only members surviving the preceding
estate share the remainder. The Restatement 9 and text writers"
contend that no distinction should be made between gifts to an
individual and to a class.
Contingent remainders may be categorized as shown in Fearne's
treatise on contingent remainders :21 (1) where the remainder de-
pends entirely on a contingent determination of the preceding estate
itself, (2) where the contingency, on which the remainder is to
take effect, is independent of the preceding estate, (3) where the
condition, upon which the remainder is limited, is certain in event,
but the determination of the particular estate may happen before it,
and (4) where the person, to whom the remainder is limited, is
" MIcI. STAT. ANN. § 26.47 (1957):
In all cases where the owner of an expectant estate, right or interest
in real or personal property, shall die prior to the termination of the
precedent or intermediate estate, if the contingency arises by which
such owner would have been entitled to an estate in possession if
living, his heirs at law if he died intestate, or his devisees or grantees
and assigns if he shall have devised or conveyed such right or inter-
est, shall be entitled to the same estate in possession.
See, Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 86 S.E.2d 256 (1955).
See, Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953).
3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940).
2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 326 (1966):
There is also little difference, with respect to the requirement of
survival, between the constructional rules applicable to gifts to indi-
viduals and gifts to classes.
SiMEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 655 (2d ed. 1956):
It is clear that, if we are not dealing with a class gift, the existence
of some other contingency does not give rise to an implied condition
precedent of survivorship.
It is submitted that the same rule should apply to class gifts. Clear-
ly there should be no fixed rule of law that a contingent class gift
cannot he so created that, if a member of a class dies before the con-
tingency happens, his interest will pass to his executor, administrator,
heir, or devisee.212 FEARNE, CONTINGENT'REMAINDERS §§ 184-87 (10th ed. 1844).
19661
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not yet ascertained, or not yet in being. While only the first and
fourth categories are material to this discussion, the categorization
is useful in illustrating that legal consequences resulting from one
type contingency should not automatically be implied as the same
consequences resulting from a different contingency.2
In Lawson the court completed a transition from early cases,
where survivorship was not implied, to the current requirement that
survivorship is mechanically attached to every contingent gift to a
class. The early view2 is represented by Sanderlin v. Deford2 in
which testator devised a life estate to S, then to S's bodily heirs and,
upon failure of heirs, to W's children and M's children. Distin-
guishing between a condition that remaindermen survive a given
period and a condition based on an unrelated event, the court held
that upon S's death without heirs the remainder interest passed to
surviving children of W and M and to administrators of predeceased
children. The contingency on the children's alternative remainder
interest was the unrelated event of the life tenant dying without
heirs, therefore a requirement of survivorship was not implied.
Two developments have apparently deterred the court from the
rule set forth in Sanderlin. (1) "Where those who are to take in
remainder cannot be determined until the happening of a stated
event, the remainder is contingent. Only those who can answer the
roll immediately upon the happening of the event acquire any estate
in the properties granted." 25 Dependency on this theory has coin-
cided with (2) the court's cessation of distinguishing the different
contingencies and their resulting legal consequences. The birth and
prosperity of this theory has been fostered from cases involving
express conditions of survivorship.2" Relying on the above phrase
as used in Strickland v. Jackson2 where a deed was to a husband
and wife for life then to surviving children, the court in Lawson
permitted only members "answering the roll immediately upon the
happening of the event"2 to share the remainder interest. It seems
1 1 AiMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.36 (1952).
"E.g., Mayhew v. Davidson, 62 N.C. 47 (1866); Sanderlin v. Deford,
47 N.C. 75 (1854); Weeks v. Weeks, 40 N.C. 111 (1847).
2447 N.C. 75 (1854).
"E.g., Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963) ; Parker
v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952).
20 Ibid.
27259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963).
21 267 N.C. at 645, 148 S.E.2d at 548 (1966).
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that a rule evolving from express conditions of survivorship should
afford no basis for an implication of survival.
The doctrine of transmissibility29 of vested and contingent inter-
ests has furthered the confusion surrounding survivorship. This
should not be a controlling factor in implying a condition of sur-
vivorship. If a contingent interest is held to be transmissible, an
implication of survivorship prevents a devisee obtaining a vested
interest upon the devisor's failure to survive distribution, while a
rule that contingent interests are not transmissible accomplishes the
same consequences as implying a condition of survivorship."
The court has adopted the rule advanced in Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Schneider 1 that a vested estate is transmissible and a
contingent estate is not transmissible. Schneider involved a life
estate of trust income to D, then income to D's children for twenty
years, and then the corpus to D's children and to children of any
child predeceasing D. A child dying during the twenty-year period
and without issue was excluded, and only children surviving the
period shared the corpus. The express condition of survivorship re-
sulting from the gift over to children of a predeceased child provides
sufficient basis for this rule as applied in Schneider.
Later treatment of transmissibility in Seawell v. Chesire"2 per-
mitted the devise of an alternative contingent interest to named
individuals but denied it in Poindexter v. Trust Co.,83 where the
alternative interest was to living brothers and sisters. The court in
Poindexter restated the rule of non-transmissibility of contingent
interests. Comparison of these cases indicates that non-transmissi-
bility exists only for an express condition of survivorship. This
affords no basis for implying a condition of survivorship, which re-
sults upon application of the Schneider rule, where the only express
contingency is unrelated to survival.
To prevent future methodical exclusion of remaindermen not
2 SIMES & SMITM, FUTURE INTERESTS § 135 (2d ed. 1956), defines trans-
missibility as the ability of an interest to be inherited and capable of such
transmission even though the original holder thereof does not survive until
the interest becomes possessory.
"' SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 85 (1951), states that if every contingent
future interest is subject to an implied condition precedent of survivorship,
then no contingent future interest should be descendible since death of the
devisor would end all rights of the devisee to take.
21235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578 (1952).
2241 N.C. 629, 86 S.E.2d 256 (1955).
29258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963).
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subject to an express condition precedent of survival, the court
should distinguish contingent interests as to survivorship or un-
related conditions precedent and proceed to apply appropriate conse-
quences depending on the nature of the contingency. The conse-
quence could be determined by statutory enactment or by judicial
adoption of a rule that survivorship will not be implied solely on
the basis of an unrelated condition. For a statutory solution the
Michigan statute34 appears to be adequate.
WILLIAm H. THoMPsoN
Insurance-Credit Life Insurance-Payment With Proceeds of
Credit Life Insurance Gives Insured's Estate a Right to
Subrogation Against Assuming Grantee
Plaintiff's testator purchased a truck and executed a conditional
sales contract to secure time payment. Included in the time price
was an amount charged for credit life insurance which the debtor
authorized the seller to purchase. Subsequently the testator trans-
ferred the truck to the defendant who assumed payment of the bal-
ance remaining on the conditional sales contract. When the testator
died, the insurer paid the balance and the creditor cleared title to
the property. Plaintiff, as executrix and individually, sued the de-
fendant to recover the amount paid by the insurer.1 In reversing a
compulsory nonsuit entered at the close of plaintiff's evidence, the
court held that "plaintiff's evidence makes out a case against defen-
dant entitling her husband's estate to subrogation against . . . the
assuming grantee . . . to obtain payment from him of the amount
paid .... "2
A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, at
least to the extent of the indebtedness." Credit life insurance is
" MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.47 (1957). See note 16 supra.
'Hatley v. Johnson, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965).
2 Id. at 84, 143 S.E.2d at 268.
' Miller v. Potter, 210 N.C. 268, 186 S.E. 350 (1936). See generally
2 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 851 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN].
The majority of courts have held that even though the creditor procures
and pays for the policy, any excess above the amount of the debt goes to
the insured's estate. See 2 APPLEEMAN § 851, at 349. North Carolina ap-
parently has not decided this point. In Miller v. Potter, supra, the lower
court decreed that the excess should be awarded to the insured's estate. This
part of the decision was affirmed, but in the meantime the parties had agreed
[Vol. 45
